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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 920800-CA 
v. ; 
DAVID SIMMONS & t Priority No. 15 
PATRICIA KAY SIMMONS, 
Defendants/Appellees• 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the grant of defendants' motions 
to suppress evidence in a case charging both defendants with 
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1992), in the First Judicial District Court 
in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Clint 
S. Judkins, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(e) (Supp. 1992) and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are; 
1. Did the trial court erroneously find that the 
search warrants in defendants' cases were served "in the night," 
as that term is used in Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990)? Factual 
findings supporting a trial court's decision on a motion to 
suppress are subject to a clearly erroneous standard. State v. 
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1990). Conclusions of 
law arising from factual findings in a motion to suppress hearing 
are subject to a correction of error standard, according no 
particular deference to the trial court. Ibid. In this case the 
trial court's determination that the warrants were served "in the 
night" also required a statutory interpretation of the meaning of 
that term as it is used in section 77-23-5. "'[An appellate 
court will] review for correctness a trial court's statutory 
interpretation, according it no particular deference.'" State v. 
Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
2. Did the trial court erroneously conclude, under 
State v. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah Sept. 28, 1992) (Rowe 
II), that because police officers in these cases did not also 
possess valid arrest warrants, it was compelled to suppress 
evidence obtained in reliance on an invalid nighttime search 
warrant? A trial court's interpretation of the law is a legal 
conclusion. "Utah appellate courts review legal conclusions 
under a correction-of-error standard, granting no particular 
deference to the trial court." State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 
1217 (Utah App. 1991) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in Addendum A where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants David Simmons and Patricia Kay Simmons were 
both charged with possession of a controlled substance with the 
intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility 
2 
or grounds of a preschool or child care facility, or that such 
act(s) were committed with a person younger than 18 years of age, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 58-37-8(1), (5) (Supp. 1992) (R. 2).1 Prior to trial 
defendants moved to suppress evidence (R. 33-37, 119-34). The 
trial court granted the motion (R. 83-84). Thereafter, the State 
petitioned for interlocutory review, which was granted by this 
Court (R. 86-117). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 20, 1992, Officer Carl Merino of the Roy 
City Police Department prepared an affidavit in support of a 
search warrant (R. 38-41). The warrant alleged the following 
facts: that a reliable confidential informant (CI) who had 
worked with the Roy City Narcotics Strike Force for two years had 
made two purchases of marijuana from one Jeremy Pettingill, first 
on December 6, 1991, and second within the preceding twenty-four 
hours; that on the first occasion Pettingill told the CI that he 
(CI) would have to go to Willard, Utah to pick up the marijuana; 
that on the second occasion the CI drove Pettingill to a 
residence located at 195 South 200 West in Willard which 
Pettingill identified as the source of his marijuana purchases; 
and that lab tests indicated that the substance purchased by 
Pettingill was marijuana (R. 39-40). 
The warrant also requested, because of the lateness of 
1
 Record references are made only with respect to defendant 
Patricia Kay Simmons' file, since the contents of both records 
are nearly identical. 
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the day, no-knock nighttime authority for the search. This 
request was based on Officer Merino's experience that narcotics 
dealers were arming themselves for protection generally, though 
the affidavit did not state specific facts relating to this case 
in support of the request for either nighttime or no-knock 
authority (R. 40-41). Judge Baldwin issued the search warrant 
with the requested no-knock nighttime authority (R. 33-34, 42-23) 
(Affidavit and Warrant are attached at Addendum B.) 
The warrant was executed at 6:30 p.m. on January 20, 
1992. Defendants and the State stipulated that the sun set at 
5:29 p.m. on that day (Findings and Order on Defendants' Motion 
to Suppress, "Order," R. 83-84, attached at Addendum C). The 
search yielded marijuana, various items relating to the 
possession and distribution of marijuana and $800, $500 of which 
was cash and firearms (Record of the preliminary hearing, R. 9). 
Defendants moved to suppress the seized evidence on the 
ground that the affidavit lacked sufficient factual information 
to support a nighttime search, relying on this Court's decision 
on the same issue in State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991) 
(Rowe X), rev'd on other grounds, 196 Utah Adv. Rep (Utah Sept. 
28, 1992) (Motion to Suppress and Supporting Memorandum, R. 33-57 
at 34-37). The State responded, noting that "nighttime" for 
warrant purposes was undefined under Utah law, but that under 
rule 41(h), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, "daytime" was 
between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., and further, that the affidavit 
contained sufficient information to support nighttime authority 
4 
(Response to Motion for Suppression, R. 58-62).2 
The trial court granted defendants' motion, which was 
first heard on August 3, 1992 (R. 66), but continued the hearing, 
before a written order issued, to October 19, 1992, because of 
disagreement on the proposed findings and on account of the 
issuance of Rowe II (see R. 67-79)• At neither hearing was 
evidence taken (see Minute Entries of August 8 and October 19, 
1992, R. 66, 82). At the October 19, 1992 hearing the parties 
discussed whether "good faith" had been previously raised 
(Transcript of Suppression Hearing, R. 120-24). The trial court 
found that matter had not been raised and was not under 
consideration; rather it wished that its reaffirmation of its 
initial granting of suppression be specifically supported by 1) 
the lack of particularity required under Rowe X and 2) that Rowe 
II be distinguished because the executing officer did not also 
have valid arrest warrants (R. 131-34, attached at Addendum D). 
However, the trial court also specifically requested that the 
State appeal its ruling (R. 132). The State appeals from the 
resulting Order (see Permission for Petition to Appeal, R. 86-
117). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Nighttime searches are undefined in Utah law. Some 
jurisdictions have adopted the view that "daytime" is that period 
2
 On appeal the State concedes that the affidavit lacked 
sufficient factual specificity to authorize nighttime entry under 
Rowe i. 
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between sunrise and sunset. Other jurisdictions have adopted the 
common law view that "daytime" is that period in which there is 
sufficient light to determine the features of a person, i.e., a 
factual determination of darkness* However, considering current 
lifestyles, and considering the precision afforded by following 
the federal rule, this Court should adopt the rule that for 
warrant purposes, "in the night," as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 
77-23-5 (1990), should lie between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 
6:00 a.m. 
In this case the trial court merely assumed that "in 
the night" was necessarily that period between sunset and 
sunrise. That unconsidered view was incorrect and necessarily 
compelled an erroneous factual finding that the warrant in this 
case had been served in the night. Even if this Court should 
decline to adopt the federal definition, it should nonetheless 
find that the trial court erred in granting suppression under 
Rowe II. 
POINT II 
Under Rowe II, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
suppression is not a proper remedy for a procedural violation 
unless the defendant can make out a fundamental violation under 
the fourth amendment or that s/he suffered prejudice or bad faith 
in the execution of the warrant. Rowe II demonstrated, by the 
authority it cited, that violation of section 77-23-5 is a 
procedural violation only and that a lack of prejudice may be 
demonstrated in circumstances other than those in which the 
6 
officers executing the warrant possess a valid arrest warrant. 
It is defendants' burden to show that they have been 
deprived of their fourth amendment rights. In this case 
defendants failed to show they suffered a fundamental violation 
under the fourth amendment or that they suffered prejudice or bad 
faith in the execution of the warrant. Further, the trial court 
incorrectly restricted its legal analysis by ordering suppression 
merely because the executing officers in this case did not also 
have valid arrest warrants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED WITHOUT SUFFICIENT 
BASIS THAT THE WARRANT WAS SERVED "IN THE 
NIGHT" UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-5 (1990). 
The defendants and the State stipulated that the sun 
set at 5:29 p.m. on January 20, 1992 and that the warrant was 
executed at about 6:30 p.m. (R. 83). From this fact the trial 
court found that the warrant was executed in the nighttime (R. 
83). 
Factual findings supporting a trial court's decision on 
a motion to suppress are subject to a clearly erroneous standard. 
State v. Bobo, 803 P-2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1990). 
Conclusions of law arising from factual findings in a motion to 
suppress hearing are subject to a correction of error standard, 
according no particular deference to the trial court. Ibid. 
"'[An appellate court will] review for correctness a trial 
court's statutory interpretation, according it no particular 
7 
deference.' State v. Jaimez, [817 P.2d 822, 826] (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115f 120 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citations omitted)." State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
Section 77-23-5 provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) The magistrate must insert a 
direction in the warrant that it be served in 
the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral 
testimony state a reasonable cause to believe 
a search is necessary in the night to seize 
the property prior to it being concealed, 
destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other 
good reason; in which case he may insert a 
direction that it be served any time of the 
day or night. An officer may request other 
persons to assist him in conducting the 
search. 
Section 77-23-5 does not specifically define "in the 
night." The State has been unable to locate any relevant 
legislative history. This Court has also previously noted that 
it too had "not found any Utah statutes or cases defining 
'nighttime.'" State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 519 n.l (Utah App. 
1992). 
In Purser, this Court declined to discuss, but 
identified, three views for determining what time is "nighttime" 
for warrant purposes: 
The first view requires a factual 
determination of whether there is sufficient 
natural light that one can distinguish a 
person's features. See, e.g., State v. 
Bumside, 113 Idaho 65, 741 P.2d 352, 356 
(1987). The second view defines nighttime 
according to sunrise and sunset. See, e.g., 
Grant v. Hass, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 688, 75 S.W. 
342, 343 (1903) (daytime is thirty minutes 
before sunrise to thirty minutes after 
sunset). The last view sets forth specific 
8 
hours for execution of a search warrant 
without special authorization. See, e.g., 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h) (6:00 a.m. to 10:00 
p.m.). 
Id. at 519 n.l. 
In Kuenzel v. State, 577 S.2d 474 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1990), the trial court was found to have properly denied a motion 
to suppress where the warrant, apparently lacking express 
nighttime authority, was served two minutes after sunset. There 
was testimony that it was still daylight when the warrant was 
served. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, essentially 
adopting the first view noted in Purser, held that "[t]he weight 
of authority supports the conclusion that where the term 
"nighttime" is not defined, the definition of "'nighttime' [is] 
based on a factual determination of darkness, rather than a rigid 
sunset-to-sunrise test," citing 26 A.L.R.3d at 975, 978 in 
support. .Id. at 509. 
However, in Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302 
(Mass. 1992), the court rejected the common law view that for 
criminal purposes "night means 'a period when the light of day 
had so far disappeared, that the fact of a person was not 
discernible by the light of the sun or twilight.'" JEd. at 306 
(citations omitted). Instead, the court adopted rule 41(h), 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 which provides that 
3
 Rule 41(c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides 
in pertinent part: 
The warrant shall be served in the daytime, 
unless the issuing authority, by appropriate 
provision in the warrant, and for reasonable 
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nighttime does not begin for warrant purposes until 10:00 p.m. 
Noting that no universal standard had emerged from its study of 
the issue, the court opined the federal rule was the one "that 
best protects the public from unreasonable intrusions by the 
police, is in keeping with current life-styles, and gives the 
police notice as to the precise time in all seasons when 
permission for a nighttime search must be requested." .Id., at 
307. 
In this case the trial court's factual determination of 
"nighttime" is totally dependent on the definition it selects. 
There was evidently no argument on this point, but it is implicit 
in the trial court's findings that it assumed that "nighttime" 
was that period between sunset and sunrise. In complete 
disregard for the alternative common law view, the trial court 
made no factual determination of darkness or that there was 
insufficient light to discern defendants' faces. 
As the court in Kuenzel noted, defining "daytime" as 
that period between sunrise and sunset appears to be a minority 
position. However, neither definition of "daytime" has the 
cause shown, authorizes its execution at 
times other than daytime. . . . 
Rule 41(h), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides 
in pertinent part: 
The term "daytime" is used in this rule to 
mean the hours from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. 
10 
precision offered by the federal rule, which specifies the hours 
of "daytime" and clearly puts the police on notice of whether, 
under the circumstances, they must request nighttime authority 
and whether their execution of the warrant is authorized. 
Similarly, the federal rule puts the public on notice of those 
periods in which a warrant may not be served without the 
specialized authority required by section 77-23-5. Furthermore, 
as the court in Grimshaw noted, service until 10:00 p.m. is in 
keeping with current lifestyles and is thereby not intrinsically 
repulsive. 
For all the reasons referenced above, this Court should 
interpret the phrase "in the night" as it is used in section 
77-23-5 to mean the period between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. 
Under that definition, the trial court erroneously found that the 
warrant, as a matter of fact, had been executed "in the 
nighttime." 
POINT II 
UNDER ROWE H THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD BE 
APPLIED ONLY IN CASES WHERE PROCEDURAL ERRORS 
IN ISSUING WARRANTS ALSO RESULT IN 
FUNDAMENTAL VIOLATIONS OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT, ARE PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS OR 
DEMONSTRATE BAD FAITH. IN THIS CASE THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED UNDER ROWE 
II THAT ONLY THE EXISTENCE OF VALID ARREST 
WARRANTS COULD SAVE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT 
TO A PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE SEARCH WARRANT 
FROM EXCLUSION. 
If this Court declines to adopt the effective federal 
definition of "nighttime," i.e., from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., 
but instead holds that "nighttime" is either 1) strictly defined 
11 
by that period from sunset to sunrise, or 2) that period in which 
the face of a person is not discernible by the light of the sun 
or twilight, i.e., a factual determination of darkness, then this 
Court should nevertheless find that the trial court erred in 
granting defendant's motion to suppress under State v. Rowe, 196 
Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah Sept. 28, 1992) (Rowe II), 
A. Rowe II Compels Suppression Only 
Upon Proof of a Fundamental Violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, Prejudice 
or Bad Faith. 
In Rowe II, the Utah Supreme Court reversed this 
Court's holding in State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991), 
that a warrant supported by an affidavit lacking sufficient 
specific facts to authorize nighttime entry under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-23-5 (1990) required suppression of evidence seized in 
execution of the warrant. The court stated: 
"Only a 'fundamental' violation of 
[a rule of criminal procedure] requires 
automatic suppression, and a violation 
is 'fundamental' only where it, in 
effect, renders the search 
unconstitutional under traditional 
fourth amendment standards. Where the 
alleged violation . . . is not 
'fundamental' suppression is required 
only where: (1) there was 'prejudice' 
in the sense that the search might not 
have occurred or would not have been so 
abrasive if the rule had been followed, 
or (2) there is evidence of intentional 
and deliberate disregard of a provision 
of the rule. . . • 
. . . It is only where the 
violation also implicates fundamental, 
constitutional concerns, is conducted 
in bad-faith or has substantially 
prejudiced the defendant that exclusion 
may be an appropriate remedy." [Quoting 
12 
State v, Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1369 
(Utah 1987) (emphasis is original),] 
The majority of courts that have 
examined the issue have determined that 
procedural violations in the execution of 
search warrants do not require suppression of 
the evidence seized. 
Id. at 15 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The court found 
the defendant had not been prejudiced where he was unable to show 
that the search would not have otherwise taken place or would 
have been less abrasive if the rule had been followed, and 
particularly because the police had authority for a nighttime 
entry pursuant to a valid arrest warrant for the owner of the 
residence which was the subject of the search. id., at 16. 
In support of its contention that failure to strictly 
conform to section 77-23-5 was only a procedural violation, Rowe 
II cited a number of cases. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 n.ll. 
Typical of those cases was United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117 
(6th Cir. 1978). 
In Searp, the affidavit lacked "reasonable cause" to 
support a warrant authorizing nighttime entry under rule 41(c), 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, while noting that 
nighttime entry may be a severe intrusion, the protection 
afforded by the rule was essentially prophylactic, i.e., 
procedural, and not intrinsically a part of the fourth amendment 
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Id., at 
1121-24* Therefore, where there was no demonstration of 
prejudice or bad faith, "requiring suppression in all cases would 
be a remedy out of all proportion to the benefits gained . . . ." 
13 
Id, at 1123. See also State v. Brock, 653 P.2d 543, 547 (Or. 
1982) (Oregon statute providing for nighttime authorization was 
"concerned with minimizing the heightened risks and apprehensions 
associated with a nighttime intrusion into the home, not with the 
overall protection against unjustified searches and seizures"). 
Rowe II also cited a number of cases supporting its 
view that absent a showing of prejudice procedural violations 
relating to the fourth amendment do not require suppression. 
Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 n.ll. See United States v. 
Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 77 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that 
although the affidavit lacked reasonable cause to support a 
nighttime search, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the 
search would not have occurred or been less abrasive if executed 
before 10:00 p.m.); Searp, 586 F.2d at 1122 (search pursuant to 
defective nighttime warrant justified where judge knew search 
would take place at night and the defendant's mother knew that 
police intended to search the house); United States v. Shelton, 
742 F. Supp. 1491, 1503 (D. Wyo. 1990) (evidence seized under 
nighttime warrant lacking reasonable cause held admissible where 
there was no evidence of prejudice, abrasive search or that 
searches would not have occurred even if nighttime warrants had 
not been promptly executed). 
Rowe II also cited Utah case law affirming the view 
that only fundamental violations of rights compel suppression. 
Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15-16 n. 9. In Fixel, the court 
refused to suppress evidence gathered by a city police officer 
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merely because he acted outside his statutory authority. Ijd. at 
1368-69. In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700f 703 (Utah 1988), the 
court found that the defendant's privacy rights were not 
prejudicially infringed by a warrant mistakenly executed in no-
knock fashion where the warrant was otherwise valid and the 
defendant was not at home. 
In none of these cases cited in Rowe IX was it required 
that technically invalid entries into residences be saved by the 
presence of a valid arrest warrant, for the obvious reason that a 
lack of prejudice may be demonstrated in innumerable ways. 
Indeed, Rowe II invokes the harmless error standard in defining a 
defendant's necessary showing of prejudice. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 16 n.13 (citing rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989) 
(errors which are "sufficiently inconsequential that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings")). Thus, in State v. Garcia, 501 N.E.2d 527 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1986), the court found the defendant unprejudiced by the 
fact that items seized in a nighttime search would also have been 
discovered if the search had been conducted the following day. 
Id. at 530. 
B. Defendant Failed to Assume His 
Burden of Proof, and the Trial 
Court Incorrectly Applied the 
the Law under Rowe II. 
1. Defendant Bears the Burden of 
Proof to Show Fourth Amendment 
Violation. 
"'The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden 
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of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated by the challenged search or seizure.'" State v. Atwood, 
831 P.2d 1056, 1058 n.l (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 886 (Utah App. 1990) from Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.l, 99 S. Ct. 421, 424 n.l (1978)). 
"Evidence sought to be excluded is admissible • . . until the 
accused has established that his rights • • . have been invaded." 
Ibid, (citations omitted). 
Rowe II explicitly stands for the proposition that a 
violation of section 77-23-5 is procedural only, and does not of 
itself constitute an infringement of fourth amendment rights 
unless there has been a showing of prejudice or bad faith. 
Therefore, in addition to showing a procedural violation related 
to his fourth amendment rights, defendant bears the further 
burden of demonstrating prejudice. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
16. See also United States v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 77 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (no showing of prejudice where the defendant failed to 
demonstrate that the search would not have occurred if the rule 
had been followed or been less abrasive if executed before 10:00 
p»m.) • 
In this case the record does not show that defendants 
did anything more than show that the sun set at 5:29 p.m. and 
that the warrant was executed at about 6:30 p.m. (R. 83). Since, 
as argued above (Appellant's Brief at Point I), there presently 
exists no Utah authority defining "nighttime" under section 77-
23-5, there is substantial doubt as to whether defendants even 
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established a technical violation of the statute. In any event, 
defendants never alleged that there was no justification for 
nighttime authorization/ that there were no facts which would 
have justified a nighttime entry, that the entry was at all 
abrasive in that defendants were discovered asleep, undressed or 
were compromised in their privacy other than as they would have 
in an undeniable daytime search, or, finally, that evidence was 
discovered which would not have been seized if the search were 
conducted the following day. 
Further, defendants never alleged that the police acted 
in bad faith in either securing or in executing the warrant. In 
sum, defendants have failed to sustain their burden that they 
were deprived of their fourth amendment rights as a result of 
official misconduct. 
2. The Trial Court Incorrectly 
Assumed That Without the Existence 
of Valid Arrest Warrants the 
Evidence Must be Suppressed. 
In deciding defendants' motion to suppress the trial 
court analyzed Rowe II. It is apparent from the trial court's 
remarks that it was fixated by the supreme court's finding that 
the defendant had not suffered prejudice because the police also 
had a valid arrest warrant for the owner of the premises (? 131-
k
 Defendants asserted at the suppression hearing that their 
motion was based on the fact that the police officers had no 
justification for nighttime entry (R. 130). Defendants are 
entirely mistaken in this assertion. The motion to suppress was 
directed exclusively toward the deficiency of the affidavit under 
Rowe Jl (see Motion to Suppress and Supporting Memor"dum, R. 33-
17 
34). The trial court's order reflects its inappropriately 
constrained view of the prejudice requirement discussed in Rowe 
3. Because there is no evidence before the 
Court that the officers who executed the 
search warrant in this case had in their 
possession a valid warrant for the arrest of 
any person within the premises searched, the 
procedural defect in failing to include 
sufficient grounds for nighttime entry, and 
the nighttime execution of this search 
warrantf amounted to a fundamental violation 
of the Defendants' rights requiring 
suppression of the evidence seized pursuant 
to the search warrant. State v. Fixel, 744 
P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987); State v. Rowe, 196 
Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1992). 
(Order, R. 84). 
A trial court's interpretation of the law is a legal 
conclusion. "Utah appellate courts review legal conclusions 
under a correction-of-error standard, granting no particular 
deference to the trial court." State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 
1217 (Utah App. 1991) . 
As noted above, Rowe II, upon which the trial court in 
this case so deliberately relied, identified, by citation to 
authority, a broad range of nonprejudicial circumstances which 
condoned the admission of evidence seized in violation of 
procedural rules or statutes (see Appellant's Brief at 11-15). 
None of those circumstances happened to involve the fortuitous 
existence of valid arrest warrants. In failing to recognize that 
a lack of prejudice may be demonstrated in circumstances other 
than those in which the officers happen to have an arrest 
warrant, the trial court incorrectly cut short the appropriate 
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inquiry and improperly granted suppression. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court adopt the effective federal definition of "nighttime," 
i.e., from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., and thereby reverse the trial 
court's order granting suppression. If this Court declines to 
adopt the federal definition, but instead holds that "nighttime" 
is strictly defined by that period from sunset to sunrise, then 
the State requests that this case be remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing on the issues of prejudice and bad faith, consistent with 
Rowe II. If this Court should hold that "nighttime" is that 
period in which the face of a person is not discernible by the 
light of the sun or twilight, then the State requests this case 
be remanded for the additional factual determination of whether 
the warrant was served in darkness, again consistent with Rowe 
n. ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / Y day of June, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
United States Constitution 
AMENDMENT IV [Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992) 
77-23-5. Time for service - Officer may request assistance. 
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant 
that it be served in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral 
testimony state a reasonable cause to believe a search is 
necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good 
reason; in which case he may insert a direction that it be served 
any time of the day or night. An officer may request other 
persons to assist him in conducting the search. 
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from 
the date of issuance. Any search warrant not executed within such 
time shall be void and shall be returned to the court or 
magistrate as not executed. 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with 
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or 
to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled 
or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his 
business as a sales representative of a manufacturer or 
distributor of substances listed in Schedules II through V except 
that he may possess such controlled substances whc :Aey are 
prescribed to him by a licensed practitioner; ci 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with 
intent to distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) 
with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty 
of a second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second 
or subsequent conviction punishable under this subsection is 
guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction 
punishable under this subsection is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
• • • • 
(5) Prohibited acts E - Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act 
declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, 
Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject 
to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (5)(b) if 
the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school 
or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of those 
schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, 
or other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, 
being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or 
institution under Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, 
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or 
structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (5)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a 
first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not 
less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have 
been established but for this subsection would have been a first 
degree felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be 
suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole until the 
minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been 
established would have been less than a first degree felony but 
for this subsection, a person convicted under this subsection is 
guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
subsection that the actor mistakenly believed the individual to 
be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was 
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor 
mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was 
not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the 
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection 
(5)(a). 
ADDENDUM B 
ZK TEE CZRCUIT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says; 
That the affiant has reason to believe that: 
( ) On the person(s) of: 
(Z ) On the premises known as: A TWO STORY DWELLING LOCATED AT 
APPROZ. 195 SOUTH 200 WEST/ WILLARD, UTAH. FIRST HOUSE NORTH OF 
200 SOUTH OK TEE EAST SIDE OF 200 WEST. A WEZTE EOUSI WITH BROWN 
TRIM, FRONT DOOR OH -TEE WEST SIDE OF TEE HOUSE/ FORCE HAS GREEK 
ASTRO TURF, DRIVEWAY OH SEE SOUTE SIDE OF TEE HOUSE. 
( ) In the vehicle(s) described as: 
In the City of WILLARD County of BOX ELDER 
state of Utah, there is now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
1—MAREFUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form. 
2—HATERIALS USED TO PACKAGE MARIJUANA, s p e c i f i c a l l y , p l a s t i o 
sandwich bags. 
3—MATERIALS TOR US ISO UARUUANA: 
a—cigarette papers,- small sheets of flammable paper with 
adhesive on-one side, 
b—pipes, used-to smoke -atari juana, 
o—roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being 
smoked. 
4—FERSONAL NOTES, records of narcotic transactions, listing names, 
dates? amounts sold. 
5—FRUITS OF NARCOTIC TRANSACTIONS, U.S. currency, cash in various 
denominations, STRICT FORCE MONEY. 
6—ALL HANDGUNS, RIFLES, AND T0TEER WEAPONS TEAT CAN PRODUCE BODILY 
INJURY. 
and that -said property or evidence: 
<Z ) Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed 
(I ) Has been used, or is possessed with the purpose of 
..being used to commit or conceal the commission of an 
offense 
t* ) Is -evidence of illegal conduct 
-The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant 
are: 
YOUR AFFIANT, "CARL MERINO, HAS BEEN EMPLOYED AS A ROY CITY POLICE 
OFFICER FOR TEE FAST TWO YEARS. PRIOR TO SEAT TIME YOUR AFFIANT 
SPENT FIVE YEARS AS A RESERVE POLICE OFFICER FOR OGDEN CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT. YOUR AFFIANT IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO TEE WEBER/HORGAN 
NARCOTICS STRIKE FORCE AND EAS BEEN GIVEN TEE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
INVESTIGATING NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND POSSESSION VIOLATIONS ZN 
WEBER AND MORGAN'COUNTIES. YOUR AFFIANT EAS ATTENDED AN 8.E0UR 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT PAGE 2 WILLARD, UTAH 
CLASS OK. KARCOTICS DURING BASIC ACADEMY TRAINING, A 16 HOUR CLASS 
OH CRACK COCAINE/ AND SEVERAL OTHER TRAINING SESSIONS OK VARIOUS 
ASPECTS OP DRUG IKVESTIGATIOKS. YOUR AFFIANT IS CURRENTLY ATTBKDIKG 
TEE UTAH DRUG ACADEMY AND HAS JUST FINISHED 8 HOURS OF DRUG 
IDENTIFICATION AND CULTIVATION OF MARIJUANA. YOUR AFFIANT EAS 
ASSISTED IK SEVERAL SEARCH WARRANTS INVOLVING KARCOTICS, AND EAS 
ASSISTED IK NUXEROUS CONTROLLED PURCHASES OF KARCOTICS. YOUR 
AFFIANT EAS WORKED WITH OTHER KARCOTICS AGENTS INVESTIGATING 
KARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION AND POSSESSION CASES. YOUR AFFIANT IS 
CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING A MARIJUANA POSSESSION AND DISTRIBUTION 
VIOLATION OCCURRING AT A RESIDENCE IN WILLARD CITY, UTAH, 
01*1 EAS WORKED WITS TEE WEBER/MORGAN STRICT FORCE 
VOLUNTARILY. CIU EAS MADE SEVERAL CONTROLLED KARCOTICS PURCHASES 
UNDER YOUR AFFIANTS SUPERVISION. 
ON 12/6/91 CIU MADE A CONTROLLED PURCHASE OF 1/8 OUNCE OF 
MARIJUANA FROM JEREMY PETTING ILL. JEREMY TOLD CIU TEAT EE GOT THE 
MARIJUANA FROM A LOCATION IN WILLARD. CIU WAS TO MEET JEREMY AT 
TEE SMITH S EDWARDS STORE ON 12/6/91 TO PICK UP TEE MARIJUANA, 
AFTER JEREMY PICKED IT UP IN WILLARD. YOUR AFFIANT WAS SUPERVISING 
TEIS PURCHASE. AT 1659 HOURS ON 12/6/91 JEREMY APPROACHED CIU FROM 
TEE NORTE AT SMITE *' "EDWARDS PARKING TOT AND GAVE CIU TEE 
MARIJUANA TEAT WAS PURCHASED. 
WITHIN THE LAST 24 HOURS, CIU AGAIN MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH 
JEREMY FETTINGIL TO PURCHASE MARIJUANA. JEREMY AGAIN STATED THAT HE 
WOULD GO TO WILLARD TO GET TEE MARIJUANA AND- STATED THAT CI#1 WOULD 
HAVE TO DRIVE. CIU DROVE JEREMY TO A RESIDENCE LOCATED ON NORTH-
EAST CORNER OF 200 SOUTH 200 WEST IN WILLARD AND PURCHASED 
APPROXXMATELY ONE OUNCE OF MARIJUANA. CIU DROVE DIRECTLY TO TEE 
RESIDENCE-AND IS CERTAIN OF-TEE LOCATION. JEREMY TOLD Clfl THAT 
THIS-CAS TEE -SAMS LOCATION THAT-JEREMY OBTAINED TEE MARIJUANA FROM 
IN TEErnaST~BUY. JEREMY ALSO TOLD CI#1 TEAT THIS LOCATION IS 
.JEREMY'S "SOURCE OF MARIJUANA AND TEAT THERE IS MORE AT TEXS SAKE 
LOCATION. JEREMY TOLD CIU TEAT EE BAD PURCHASED MARIJUANA AT THIS 
•RESIDENCE ON 1-20-92 FOR HIMSELF. 
Your Affiant believes that -the named premises, and person should be 
searched .for .drug -paraphernalia. Affiant knows from experience and 
training that these items are almost always found on premises where 
-narcotic search warrants have been .served. Your Affiant also Knows 
that the suspect must keep such iferns on hand-to test or to allow 
customers to -use the substance being purchased. 
Your Affiant believes the premises should be searched for reoords 
-of narcotic* sales and residency papers. Your affiant Knows from 
past execution of numerous search warrants that suspects often Keep 
such reoords to shov amounts purchased, dates of purchases/ who 
purchased, and especially drug indebtedness. 
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be searched 
for packaging material, suspects selling Marijuana have to package 
the -drug -from larger quantities to be sold. Further, your Affiant 
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lieves that the premises is an ongoing operation, and these items 
uld be on hand for the purpose ef selling the substance. 
ur Affiant prays for a night time service as veil as no-knock 
rvice of the warrant. Tour affiant knows form experience and 
•aining that sore and more narcotics dealers are arming themselves 
>r protection against one another as veil as from narcotics users. 
>ur affiant has been on numerous narootie search warrants where 
.rearms are available to suspects inside the premises. Further, 
>ur affiant believes it is safer for the officers serving tne 
arrant as veil as non-participants to the narootie sales / if the 
tticers have the oover of -darkness as veil as no-knock service. 
urther grounds for issuance of a search warrant are attached 
areto and incorporated herein. 
ee attachment(s) 
'our a-ffiant considers the information received from the 
ionfidential informant reliable because: 
!I#1 "HAS GIVES YOUR AFFIANT PULL HAKE/ DOB, AND ADDRESS. CI#1 HAS 
10 KNOWN CRIMINAL CHARGE PENDING. CZfl HAS WORKED WITS TEE STRIKE 
?ORCE FOR APPROXIMATELY-TOO-YEAES. -CI#1-XS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN 
TEE UTAH POLICE ACADEMY. CI#1 HAS GIVEN INFORMATION ZK TEE PAST 
7EICE HAS BEEN USED TO KATE CONTROLLED PURCHASES 07 NARCOTICS. TEE 
INFORMATION IS FRESH AND YOUR AFFIANT BELIEVES IT TO EE RELIABLE. 
The .following Information corroborates the facts given by the 
confidential informant: 
CI?1 STATED TEAT TEE CI WOULD PURCHASE ONE-EIGHTH OUNCE OF 
MARIJUANA. CI#1 WAS ABLE TO PURCHASE TEE ONE-EIGHTH OUNCE OF 
MARIJUANA. CI*1 STATED TEAT EE WOULD PURCHASE APPROXIMATELY ONE 
OUNCE OF MARIJUANA TEROUGE JEREMY AND HIS SOURCE, AND WAS AGAIN 
ABLE TO HAKE TEE PURCHASE OF APPROXIMATELY ONE OUNCE OF MARIJUANA. 
.ZEE TEST -PERFORMED ON TEE FIRST ONE-EIGHTH OUNCE OF MARIJUANA 
PURCHASED TEROUGE JEREMY CAMS BACK POSITIVE FOR MARIJUANA. THIS 
TEST WAS CONDUCTED EY-THE NORTEERN UTAH CRIMINALISTIC LAB. A FIELD 
~TEST"OF A-EAMPLE OF "THE .ONE OUNCE OF MARIJUANA PURCHASED WITHIN THE 
LAST 24 HOURS SHOWED POSITIVE FOR MARIJUANA. 
•Wherefore the affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for the 
seizure pf said items: 
( ) In the daytime 
(Z) At any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to t 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered or for 
other good reasons as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT—FA6E 4 WILLARD, UTAH 
JEOUR AFFIANT BELIEVES THAT TFRRB XS X QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA XT TEE 
RESIDENCE XV glLtlftl), BTAE XT THIS TINE AND TEAT TO DELAY WOULD 
XFHORDTES RESIDENTS ftMPrJT TIKE TO 6SLL, DESTROY, OR HOVE TEE 
KARUUAKA* • DUE TO THE LATE SOUR 07 THE DAS YOUR AFFIANT REQUESTS 
TEAT TEE WARRANT BE ISSUED FOR DAY OR NIGHT TIKE SERVICE. 
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested 
warrant ztot .be .required -to give notice of his authority or purpose 
because: 
(x ) The property sought may be quickly destroyed/ disposed 
-of or-secreted. 
t ) "Physical harm-may result to any person if notice were 
-given. 
This danger believes to exist because x 
IH THE CIRCUIT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
***************************************************************** 
SEARCH WARRANT 
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER ZK TEE STATE OF UTAH: 
Proof by affidavit under oath haying been made this day before me 
by: AGENT CARL MERINO J am 
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that: 
( ) On the person(s) of: 
(Z) On the premises known as: A TWO STORY DWELLING LOCATED AT 
APPRO!. 195 SOUTS 200 WEST/ WXLLARD, UTAH. FIRST SOUSE NORTE OF 
200 SOUTS ON TEE EAST SIDE OF 200 WEST. A WEXTS SOUSE WITS BROWN 
TRIM, FRONT DOOR ON TEE WE8T SIDE OF TEE SOUSE, PORCH SAS GREEN 
ASTRO TURF, DRIVEWAY ON TEE SOUTS SIDE OF TEH SOUSE* 
( } In the vehicle(s) described as: 
In the city of WILLARD County .of BOX ELDER 
State of Utah, there is not being possessed or concealed certain 
property or evidence described as: 
1—MARIJUANA, a green leafy substanoe in dried form* 
2—MATERIALS USED TO PACKAGE MARIJUANA, Specifically, plastic 
sandwich bags. 
3—MATERIALS FOR USING MARIJUANA: 
- a—cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with 
adhesive on one side, 
b—pipes, used to smoke marijuana, 
c—roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being 
smoked* 
4—PERSONAL NOTES, records of narcotic transactions, listing names, 
dates, amounts sold* 
5—FRUITS OF NARCOTIC TRANSACTIONS, U.S. Currency, cash in various 
denominations, STRIKE FORCE HONEY* 
6—ALL HANDGUNS, RIFLES, AND OTHER WEAPONS TEAT CAN PRODUCE BODILY 
INJURY. 
Which property or evidence: 
(Z) Was unlawfully acquired-or is unlawfully possessed 
(X) Has been used, or is possessed with the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of.an 
offense 
(Z) Is evidence of illegal conduct 
10V *2LB TEEZSP0S2 COKMMOJED 
( ) In the daytime 
(X) Xt any time, day or night 
(X) To execute without notice of authority or purpose 
To make a search of the above, named or described person (s), 
premises and vehicle (s) for the herein above described property or 
evidence,..and .if.you find the -£ame>»-or any part thereof, to bring 
it forthwith before me at the CI&CUIZ Court, County of WEBER 
state of Utah, or retain such^cpj>&rty in your custody subject to 
the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND DA' 193X 
ADDENDUM C 
JAY D. EDMONDS #957 
Attorney for David Simmons 
1660 Orchard Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: 484-3218 
BRIGHAK D'STPin 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
- vs -
DAVID SIMMONS and 
PATRICIA KAY SIMMONS, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER ON DEFEN-
DANTS' MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Criminal Nos. 921000014 
921000015 
The Defendants' Motion to Suppress came before the Court 
for hearing on August 3, 1992, and for rehearing on October 19, 1992; 
defendants were each present with counsel and the State was repre-
sented by Jon J. Bunderson, Box Elder County Attorney. A written 
Motion to Suppress evidence in these cases was previously filed 
and supporting Memoranda were filed by both parties. The State filed 
a Supplemental Memorandum herein. The parties stipulated that the 
search warrant in these cases was executed at 6:30 p.m. on January 
20, 1992 and that the sun set at 5:29 p.m. that day. The Court, 
having heard the arguments and representations of counsel and ha-
ving considered the Memoranda in support of and opposition to the 
motion, and being otherwise fully advised herein, the Court now 
makes the following findings: 
1. That the search warrant in these cases was executed 
in the nighttime. 
^.^^ 2. That the affidavit in support of the seaifefte\terxaiit^ _ 
M I C R O F I L M E D ^ZtOoSnR^ 
alleges no specific facts justifying a nighttime search as re-
quired by §77-23-5(1), Utah Code Ann., but rather alleges matters 
based upon the affiant's general knowledge and experience in drug 
cases. 
3. Because there is no evidence before the Court that 
the officers who executed the search warrant in this case had in 
their possession a valid warrant for the arrest of any person within 
the premises searched, the procedural defect in failing to include 
sufficient grounds for nighttime entry, and the nighttime execution 
of this search warrant, amounted to a fundamental violation of the 
Defendants' rights requiring suppression of the evidence seized 
pursuant to the search warrant. State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 
1987); State v. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1992). 
Based upon the foregoing findings, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that all evidence seized pursuant to the execution of the search 
warrant in these cases, and the fruits of all such eyi^ence, be, 
and the same are hereby suppressed. 
DATED this IP day of 0JLubei, 199, 
BY THE COURT1 _ _ 
S.g JtJDKINS 
First District Judge 
FORM AND CONTENT APPROVED 
ANS-eeetaEECEfVED: 
BUNDERSON 
Elder County Attorney 
ADDENDUM D 
1 exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for 
2 violation of the nighttime search warrant provisions 
3 of section 77-23-10?" That's the issue they ruled on. 
4 That's what they're referring to in the second to the 
5 last paragraph that I read earlier. 
6 I think it's unfortunate that they have 
7 clouded it a bit by throwing in the warrant of arrest 
8 provision, but that's how they framed the issue and 
9 that's how they answered the issue. So I would submit 
10 that what we're seeing here is simply that the 
11 exclusionary rule doesn't apply to this particular 
12 statutory violation. 
13 THE COURT: In ruling on this, gentlemen, I 
14 struggled with this. As I indicated, I've read this 
15 several times since it first came out, because I knew 
16 it would be pertinent to the motion before the court, 
17 I or at least on appeal that someone would review it. 
18 I'm not really sure what Chief Justice 
19 Hall is saying in this, other than, and I'm referring 
20 to the bottom of page 15 and it begins with "It is of 
21 particular significance that in addition to the search 
22 warrant the officers carried a valid warrant for the 
23 arrest." He goes on and talks about how that applied 
24 to this case. Justice Durham and Justice Zimmerman 
25 both concurred on that very point. Howe and Stewart 
1 also thought it of particular significance that a 
2 search warrant had been issued. 
3 In the Simmons case, the case before this 
4 court, no search warrant is issued, so what this court 
5 has to do is excise that part of the Supreme Court's 
6 decision and see if it applies to this case. In other 
7 words, overturning Rowe. They very well may do it, 
8 but I don't think they have in this case. They've 
9 gone to the extent that they said if you have a search 
10 warrant out there we will overturn it, or, excuse me, 
11 an arrest warrant, we will overturn it. They very 
12 well may overturn it if there isn't a search warrant, 
13 but they didn't in this case. 
14 Mr. Bunderson, I'd encourage you to appeal 
15 my decision to the Court of Appeals, but at this point 
16 in time, to be consistent with Rowe one, and at least 
17 what I can perceive to be consistent with Rowe two, 
18 I've got to deny -- I've got to grant the motion to 
19 suppress based on the earlier hearing. 
20 MR. BUNDERSON: So basically we're excluding the 
21 evidence under the exclusionary rule? 
22 THE COURT: Yes, based on Rowe one and to the 
23 extent that Rowe two I don't think applies to that 
24 because there was no search warrant -- excuse me, no 
25 arrest warrant in this particular case. 
1 MR. BUNDERSON: Okay. And the remedy you're 
2 ordering, then, is exclusion of the evidence? 
3 THE COURT: Supression of the evidence. I find 
4 that pursuant to those rules that this is a 
5 fundamental violation of the defendants' rights. 
6 MR. BUNDERSON: I think that narrows it enough so 
7 we can probably confuse the law even further. 
8 MR. EDMONDS: What do we do now about the good 
9 faith exception finding? 
10 THE COURT: This court isn't considering that 
11 now. That wasn't brought before the court at the 
12 previous hearing. 
13 MR. EDMONDS: May I suggest that the order -- the 
14 proposed order that Mr. Hutchison submitted, which, by 
15 the way, I drafted, just be signed by the court, with 
16 the delineation? 
17 THE COURT: No. I want that restructured. 
18 Either you can do it or Mr. Bunderson can do it. I 
19 I found that the reason for the supression in this case 
20 was State vs. Rowe one. The court in that case 
21 specifically ennunciated that you have to have 
22 particularized circumstances to justify a nighttime 
23 search. I think that should be reflected in the 
24 order. 
25 I Then we can include this in it, that e\ *,n 
though Rowe two has come out, in this case the court 
distinguishes it from Rowe two in as much as in this 
case there was no arrest warrant, 
MR. EDMONDS: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Who is going to prepare that order? 
MR. EDMONDS: Mr. Bunderson had a problem with 
preparing it before. I assume that problem still 
exists so I'll have another go at it. 
THE COURT: Very well. If you will prepare tha 
and submit it to the court. Court will be in recess 
THE BAILIFF: Court will be in recess. 
(Concluded at 3:55 p.m.) 
